Acho a idéia de direitos humanos muito interessante e acredito que esse discurso pode ajudar no progresso de uma melhor sociedade para todos, ocidentais ou não. Mas um ponto que sempre me deixa pouco confortável é sobre a constante falta de pragmatismo dos defensores dos direitos humanos. Creio que proposições idealizadas que não consideram as distribuições de poder e as limitações impostas pelos fatos sejam auto-destruidoras -- se quiserem, "o ótimo é inimigo do bom" ou ainda "os fatos prevalecem sobre o direito".
Muito interessante, na minha opinião, é que a maior parte dos defensores de uma versão idealizada de direitos humanos muitas vezes não se dá conta disso -- admitem que "direitos têm custos" e crêem que isso é suficiente. Mas não me interessa aqui os aspectos internos dos eventuais custos dos direitos humanos, que é mais discutido no âmbito de Direito do Estado. Gostaria de lançar uma proposta de debate sobre limitações internacionais à noção idealizada de Direitos Humanos (um tópico, que creio, deveria ser objeto da matéria "Teoria dos Direitos Fundamentais" no mestrado da UERJ).
Para começar a reflexão sobre o assunto, segue abaixo uma resposta às críticas da Anistia Internacional ao tribunal que vai julgar se houve violações do Dir. Int'l (genocídio) pelo Khmer Rouge, no Cambodia. O tema é atual porque ontem começou o julgamento de um dos líderes (clique aqui para o link na CNN). O tribunal para o Khmer é claramente um compromisso entre noções ideais e limitações concretas. Maiores detalhes sobre sua cronologia e sobre a legislação a ele aplicável podem ser encontrados neste site de Yale (tem os documentos internacionais, a lei nacional que implementou o tribunal, etc.).
Aguardo suas considerações! Abraços a todos.
Perfection Is The Enemy of Justice
By Dr. Gregory H. Stanton
At least 1.7 million Cambodians died during Khmer Rouge rule in Cambodia from 1975 through 1978. On 13 May 2003, the United Nations General Assembly approved an Agreement between the U.N. and the Royal Government of Cambodia to establish a tribunal to try the surviving leaders of the Khmer Rouge. The Assembly appealed to the international community to provide assistance, including financial and personnel support, to the tribunal.
The Khmer Rouge were driven out of power in 1979, but for years after that the U.S. and other nations voted to seat them in the United Nations, and opposed all efforts to bring them to justice. In 1991, a Cambodian peace agreement was signed and in […] 1997 the Cambodian government requested help from the U.N. to set up a tribunal. The UN appointed a Group of Experts to study the legal case, and in 1999 these jurists recommended establishing a tribunal.
Years of negotiations followed. The U.N. tried to impose a U.N run tribunal. Cambodia insisted that the tribunal be majority Cambodian, under Cambodian law. Agreement was reached in 2001 on a mixed tribunal with a Cambodian majority, but requiring super-majority agreement by international judges for all decisions. Administration will be shared by Cambodian and U.N. officials, prosecutors, and investigating judges. The maximum penalty will be life in prison. The Cambodian National Assembly passed a law to establish the tribunal on these terms.
The devil […] rose again in the details. In February 2002, U.N. negotiators broke off implementing talks, and were only forced back into them by a U.N. General Assembly Resolution passed in December. Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch opposed the Resolution, because it directed the U.N. to base its agreement with Cambodia on the Cambodian law, which they found deficient.
Following negotiations ,an Agreement [was reached] on 17 March 2003. The Cambodian government met four key demands of the U.N. It agreed to amend the Cambodian law to simplify the tribunal’s appeals process, to incorporate the rights of the accused enshrined in Articles 14 and 15 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and to affirm that the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties prohibits invocation of national law to escape international treaty obligations. With respect to amnesty, the plan states that "the Royal Government of Cambodia would undertake not to request one for any persons who might be investigated or convicted of crimes under the Agreement."
Amnesty International (AI) and Human Rights Watch […] have insisted on another international tribunal, not a court that Cambodians will accept as their own. One of the shortcomings of the Yugoslav and Rwandan tribunals has been their lack of relationship with national legal systems. Throughout its critique, AI ignores the fact that the U.N. – Cambodian Agreement is supplementary to the 2001 Cambodian law. AI fails to even append the text of the Cambodian law to its Report, which includes the Agreement and the Secretary-General’s Report to the U.N. General Assembly.
[...]
AI says that “the proposed mixture of Cambodian and international judges and complicated decision making process has no precedent in any domestic or international court,” ignoring the Sierra Leone tribunal and courts in East Timor and Kosovo, which are also mixed courts.
[...]
AI criticizes the Agreement because it does not include provisions for reparations, calling this a “major retreat from the Rome Statute,” even though such provisions are not part of most common law systems of justice. The Cambodia tribunal will try only a few top leaders of the Khmer Rouge. Ten old men will not have the means to give restitution or compensation to 1.7 million victims. UN Trust Funds connected to tribunals have been notably unsuccessful at raising funds for such purposes. AI wants “rehabilitation, satisfaction, and guarantees of non-repetition” as well. Surely the only satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition of mass murder that the tribunal can offer are trial and punishment of the perpetrators.
Finally, AI expects the tribunal to help rebuild the entire Cambodian system of justice. By setting an example of fair trials in a well-managed court, it will do so. It is also a reason for making the tribunal a special part of the Cambodian court system and locating it in Phnom Penh. But to reject the Agreement because the court cannot do everything is equivalent to saying that because all law-breakers cannot be captured and tried, none should be.
This all-or-none approach to justice for Cambodia has been characteristic of some human rights groups from the beginning. In 1981, when I asked the International Commission of Jurists to undertake investigations of the atrocities of the Khmer Rouge, the Chairman of the Board refused with the reason that if they could not investigate violations by the Vietnamese-backed government that drove the Khmer Rouge from power, they would not investigate the Khmer Rouge mass murders. All-or-none standards are self-defeating. Perfection is the enemy of justice.
[...]
Dr. Gregory H. Stanton is Founder and Director of The Cambodian Genocide Project; President of Genocide Watch; and Coordinator of The International Campaign to End Genocide.
Bangkok Post, 2003
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